The perception of interpersonal communication as a deliberate exchange of intentions and information governed by the maxims of quantity, quality, relation and manner as well as the designs of communication pragmatists , who would like to view this dynamic cognitive process of coding and encoding meanings in terms of fulfilling or not fulfilling the rules of communication, which are external to an individual, are very much responsible for thinking about ambiguity as a violation of the rules of good conversation.
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, who would like to view this dynamic cognitive process of coding and encoding meanings in terms of fulfilling or not fulfilling the rules of communication, which are external to an individual, are very much responsible for thinking about ambiguity as a violation of the rules of good conversation.
Only the adoption of a cognitive point of view in researching and describing polysemes fundamentally changes this perspective. The perception and processing of information includes handling not only the sensory data but also memories or imagination. Because of that, the categorization is polysemic in itself, as is our thinking and, in consequence, our communication 2 . The same specimen may either be categorized as belonging to A or to Z, depending on the influence of the previously activated categories 3 . Ambiguity seen from the perspective of the properties of categorization processes of the sender and the recipient (not in terms of immanent, predominantly language-specific property of the message) is no longer only a simple violation of the maxims of manner and quantity, an exception from the rules of a properly organized process of conversation, but becomes a rule of communication 4 .
The way in which politicians communicate is characterized by a particular awareness of the benefits which stem from the ambiguous nature of information handling processes. The analyses of TV interviews conducted by Peter Bull 5 with British politicians in the years 1987-1997 explicitly show that out of all of their answers, less than half was comprised of unambiguous and direct statements. Both Margaret Thatcher and her main opponent from the Labour PartyNeil Kinnock -gave direct answers to less than 40% of questions (respectively 37% and 39% ) during the election campaign in 1987. Even though during the next elections some of the participants changed, the rates of avoiding clear and concrete answers remained the same (John Major -the Prime Minister and the leader of the Conservative Party -gave direct answers to only 40% of the questions, Neil Kinnock -to 51%, whereas the leader of the Liberal Democrat party -to 63%). What is more, ambiguous answers constituted as much as 71% of all answers given by Tony Blair prior to the elections in 1997. By comparison -the analysis of the interview conducted by Martin Bashir with princess Diana demonstrated that in her case the journalist received clear answers to 78% of the questions asked, whereas Jon Snow, who interviewed Monika Lewinsky, received a concrete answer to as much as 89% of the questions 6 . What is responsible for such a strong preference for ambiguity in the way in which politicians communicate? Certainly, strategic and image-related profits resulting from ambiguous communication, especially if the political message is supposed to reach different groups of the electorate, and every recipient is intended to find something of interest.
Shifting the focus in thinking about ambiguity from the message to communication leads to specific, pragmatic consequences. If the limits of cognitive ambiguity are determined only by cognitive boundaries, both the sender and the recipient have a nearly unrestrained interpretative freedom in coding and encoding the meanings in communication. So, how is communication possible? Is its success dependent on the degree of ambiguity in any way? How is ambiguity manifested in communication? . The choice of exposé as a potential source of categories for analysis stems directly from the programme-related nature of this type of speech, in which the aims are described, the problems (categories) are identified, and ways of their realisation or elimination (the specimen of the category) are determined 10 . While this article compares the concepts extracted from the exposés of Prime Ministers who come from two different political 7 The comparison of categories distinguished as part of the textual material analysis is presented in the form of a table at the end of the article. 8 The experiments conducted by the American psychologist Eleanor Rosch were pioneering in the field of experimental psychology; she explored the structures of categories and the nature of mental categorization processes. The results questioned the legitimacy of the classical model of cognitive category description, which assumed the existence of impassable boundaries between the terms, while perceiving every element of a category as a legitimate representative. Rosch's experiments proved that, in most cases, the human mind organizes the world on the basis of entirely different mechanisms. The majority of people participating in her experiments were inclined to consider an "apple" to be a better representative of the FRUITS category than a "nut". Likewise, a "pigeon" was perceived as more representative of the BIRD category than an "ostrich" or a "penguin". In view of the above, it was necessary to work out a description of the conceptual system which would assume a radial structure of concepts -there is a central, prominent element, a prototype of a given category, and the remaining elements are included in the scope of the concept if they are similar to the prototypical representative. It is also possible to establish the degree to which it belongs to the given set depending on its distance from the "centre". The scalarity of the conceptual system, introduced in opposition to the model based on binary oppositions, appears to be better at rendering the continuous nature of phenomena perceived in the world around us. Rosch's second important discovery concerned the basic level, which -as Maria Indyk aptly described it -"has a privileged, particular position as part of the vertical order of categorization levels". This means that DOG constitutes a category of basic level as opposed to the more general ANIMAL or more specific DACHSHUND. Relying on the concepts of prototype and basic level introduced by Rosch, American linguist George Lakoff presented a new perspective on semantic units and ways they can be studied. The rules of a previously ignored psychological aspect -rules of perception, experience, knowledge and imagination of the sender and the recipient -were included in the analysis of the meaning-making process; this meant that the assumption concerning the existence of so-called appropriate meanings had to be rejected, and the thesis pertaining to the vagueness of thinking and blending as a property of thinking responsible for the processes of categorization, both in terms of recognition and creativity, had to be accepted. Metaphor and metonymy are thus naturally ambiguous, functioning in our brains on the basis of the rule of blending, whereas the categories of our everyday thinking are metaphoric. 9 In connection with their tendency to prefer ambiguity. 12 were analysed), the only aim of the author was to present as many emanations of ambiguity as possible and draw conclusions as to its nature on their basis; the legitimacy or ethical aspects of communicating through ambiguity in politics (the interpretation of these is left to sociologists, political scientists and political marketing specialists) are not considered here.
The results of the conducted analyses generally seem to lead to three conclusions:
1) The ambiguity understood as the use of polysemic categories is present in both messages, even though its intensity varies. Monosemic categories with one distinct centre and specimens concentrated around it are dominant in Kopacz's speech (11 out of 14: SUCCESS OF OUR COUNTRY, POLAND'S PROSPER-ITY, FOREIGN POLICY, SECURITY, PUBLIC FINANCES, HEALTHY ECONOMY, DEMOGRAPHIC CRISIS, DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE, THE POTENTIAL OF THE SEA, DIGITAL REVOLUTION, CULTURE). In Szydło's address, among the categories for which the pairs of: centre and category specimen (10) were distinguished, six constitute polysemic categories (with more than one centre of the category and radial structure: CHANGE, CAPITAL, CHALLENGES, SECURITY, FAMILY, JUSTICE). In this sense, cognitive ambiguity constitutes a natural component of every communication -directly resulting from the properties of categorization processes -at a certain basic level: the structure of categories, which in themselves may be monosemic or polysemic.
2) Over the course of categorical analysis of Beata Szydło's address
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, the presence of naturally polysemic conceptual blends was observed (3: GOOD CHANGE, ACTIVATION OF THE GREAT RESERVE, CHALLENGES OF THE FUTURE); they were created as a result of blending categories whose scope was only partially defined (the scope of categories in the input space 1: CHANGE, BIG RESERVES and CHALLENGES is known,but not in the case of input space 2: GOOD, ACTIVATION and FUTURE). The degree of ambiguity rises along with the extension of the interpretative margin. Therefore, in the case of blends, we are dealing with second level ambiguity.
3) What is more, if we are dealing with a situation in which the conceptual blends are created as a result of projecting the scope of polysemic categories onto a generic space (CHANGE, GREAT RESERVES as well as CHALLENGES are polysemic categories) or as a result of projecting categories whose scope was not specified in communication in any way (as in the case of categories manifested in the text: GREAT INVESTMENT PLAN, THE ACTUAL BREAKTHROUGH, DEEP RECONSTRUCTION, THE PRO�ECT OF REPARING THE STATE; no specimens were indicated for these categories), the interpretative margin extends even further. In such case we may think of a high-order ambiguity 14 . Therefore, cognitive ambiguity may be manifested in communication at multiple stages: on the basic level (resulting from the polysemic nature of concepts, which have more than one centre and radial structure, but rather specific scope; the role of the recipient's creativity in processing the information is limited by said scope), on the second level (as a consequence of the polysemic nature of blends created through blending categories; the scope may be partially known, hence the role of the recipient's creativity in processing the information increases), and through the high-order ambiguity (operating with blends created through blending polysemic categories or categories whose scope is unknown -then the role of the recipient's creativity in processing the information is limited only by the boundaries of his/her perception).
The basic level ambiguity: polysemic categories
In Langacker's cognitive grammar, recognition, that is the perceived similarity between two language categories, underlies two types of categorizing relations: elaboration and semantic extension. While trying to assign a particular specimen to a category, we either place it on a continuum between hyponymic and hyperonymic extremities depending on its similarity to the typical specimen (elaboration) or, if the attributes of both specimens overlap or partially overlap, we extend the category. We may thus claim that we categorize the specimens WALL-MOUNT-ED, CORK, METAL by means of their elaboration to the category of BOARD, whereas CHESSBOARD -through its extension. The pattern of BOARD abstracted in the mind (out of all specimens of the category), sanctions both the prototype of the category and its elaborations (vertically and horizontally organized: WALL-MOUNTED BOARD, that is WALL-MOUNTED CORK BOARD, WALL-MOUNTED METAL BOARD etc.) and its extensions (CHESSBOARD), which significantly differ from the prototype. Both in the cases of elaboration and extension, we are dealing with a perceived similarity between categories -CORK BOARD as well as CHESSBOARD are perceived as similar, but CORK BOARD is obviously more similar to the prototypical BOARD than CHESSBOARD 15 .
14 The high-order ambiguity was not observed in Ewa Kopacz's exposé. Does this diversification of similarity affect the recognition of the specimens' belonging to individual categories? According to J. Taylor (1995 Taylor ( /2001 , in the case of monosemic categories such as BOARD, the essence of recognition is in elaboration based on the rule of prototypical organization of concepts, while the meanings of polysemic categories such as SCHOOL -are subjected to the rule of family similarity 16 . As long as monosemic concepts are concentrated around one centre, which focuses the elaboration and extension of categories (as in the case of the above-mentioned category . 16 Many of the doubts concerning the validity of the classical theory of concepts were indicated by Ludwig Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations. He attempted to define the concept Spiel (GAME) and observed that different elements of this category lack a common set of properties, which would allow one to clearly establish what a game is, and what it is not. The boundaries of this category are therefore blurred -which does not diminish its usefulness for communicational purposes. Wittgenstein observed that the category GAME is not built in accordance with the principles of common defining properties, as Aristotle thought, but on the basis of a grid of crossing similarities, analogically to the similarity of all members of a family. Some attributes of certain elements of this category are common with others, whereas some are not. However, a pool of features common to all elements of a given category or -according to classical theory -a set of so-called defining features of a game does not exist 17 It is marginal, yet interesting, that while in Kopacz's understanding SECURITY is monosemic, and its specimens (DEFENCE SPENDING, MODERN EQUIPMENT FOR THE POLISH ARMY, CONSOLIDATION OF DEFENCE INDUSTRY, CENTRE OF VETERANS) are concentrated around one centre (ARMY), in Szydło's understanding -it is polysemic (the categories of security include: MILITARY SECURITY, ENERGY SECURITY and FOREIGN POLICY).
Level two ambiguity and high-order ambiguity: polysemic conceptual blends
The mechanism responsible for the creation of new meanings, according to Fauconnier's and Turner's cognitive grammar, is the process of blending mental spaces -"conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local understanding and action"
18 . As a result of cross-space mapping, the corresponding elements of the input spaces are linked: first by being projected onto the generic space (the common elements of two input spaces overlap), and then by adding new structures which were not initially present. Thus, a new quality is created -a conceptual blend; although it operates with contents available to cognition (in individual understanding), it simultaneously can and does go beyond what is known. Due to that fact, the same input spaces, according to Fauconnier and Turner, may lead to the creation of different blends, depending on the "scenario" evoked by the learning mind in the process of categorizing
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. Blends are naturally strongly polysemic. If, in addition, they are created by projecting a scope of polysemic categories onto the generic space, or when they are created through projecting categories whose scope was never manifested in communication -then we are dealing with high-order ambiguity.
The GOOD CHANGE blend is created by projecting the contents of input space 1: CHANGE (whose scope was indicated in the exposé: a change in THE QUAL-ITY OF GOVERNANCE -"no more arrogance of those in power, no more hubris", change in the ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT'S WORK -by establishing new ministries -as well as the change of CURRENT POLICY) onto the generic space. The scope of the category in input space 2: GOOD was not indicated at all (what is GOOD becomes dependent on individual mental data; in other words -GOOD may have different meaning for everyone). Similarly, the blend ACTIVA-TION OF A GREAT RESERVE, created through projecting the contents of the category of input space 1: GREAT RESERVE, whose centre is constituted by: FINAN-CIAL CAPITAL, but also UNREALISED INTELLECTUAL POTENTIAL OF POLISH PEOPLE, and the contents of the category of input space 2: ACTIVATION (in what way will the CAPITAL and POTENTIAL be ACTIVATED is defined individually). Because the boundaries of GOOD and ACTIVATION were not specified in any way -the categories to which the specimens belong will be determined every time by the result of a separate and individualized interpretative process.
18 G. Fauconnier, M. Turner, "Tworzenie amalgamatów jako jeden z głównych procesów w gra-"Tworzenie amalgamatów jako jeden z głównych procesów w gramatyce", trans. May the multilevelled ambiguity hamper the processes of categorization in the learning mind? What outlines the boundaries of polysemy? According to Langacker, "our mental experience is coherent by virtue of the structure we impose on it […]"
20 . From this point of view, the limits of human cognition would also constitute the only boundary of polysemy. The researcher observes: "A pivotal aspect of this structuring capacity is the interpretation of novel experience with reference to previous experience, which I relate to the inherent asymmetry between standard and target in acts of comparison […] The previous experience in question can also take the form of a well-entrenched routine activated for the structuring of current sensations (as in the recognition of a familiar shape)"
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. Therefore, from the point of view of cognitive processing, nothing is lost due to ambiguity, even when multi-levelled. Do we gain anything, and if sowhat?
On a few functional limitations of ambiguity-based communication
According to Benjamin I. Page, the author of the emphasis allocation theory of political ambiguity, the messages which are made public by the politicians are neither clear nor concrete by default. The ambiguity of their communication results, according to him, directly from the need to properly allocate the available resources (time, energy and money), conditioned both by the limitations on the sender's side, as well as on the side of the recipient of the messages (selectiveness of coding and encoding, limitations of perceptive processes, but also that of storing information in memory) 22 and from the communication chan- nel (public communication is always mediated by the media) or the context (the statements of other politicians from the same or opposing political parties). Naturally, only chosen political issues and only some suggestions for dealing with them -the less specific the less susceptible to judgement and rejection -may be communicated. Research explicitly indicates that detailed proposals in political programmes are relatively inefficient in winning voter support, and the voters themselves are often uninterested in such messages since their understanding requires an effort and an appropriate level of reference (for example, thorough knowledge of the issue at hand, law or a field of economics)
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; because of that -according to Page -politicians strategically make their statements vague, directing the recipients' free cognitive resources to general topics and easily available processes of handling them (categories such as FAMILY and JUSTICE are preferred to ENERGY UNION or GREENHOUSE GAS RE-DUCTION). Importantly, it is the cognitive availability of the category, and not the diversity of opinions concerning it, that is -from the point of view of effective communication -crucial, since the higher the dispersion of recipients with reference to the discussed issue, the higher the efficiency of ambiguous messages 24 . On the other hand, according to Douglas Walton 25 , every ambiguity should be eventually resolved if we do not want to risk losing the trust of recipients (due to the informational chaos which stems from assigning different scopes to the same categories). And while ambiguity as a communicational strategy helps politicians to prevent the polarization of judgements (concentration around one, distinctive opinion), in a situation in which the cognitive economy of participants of communication goes along with their lack of knowledge of the problem in question, using ambiguity is always connected with the risk of reducing unavailable categories to the ideological level (for example if the CLI-MATE PACKAGE is discussed and recipients lack the necessary knowledge of the EU's energy policy to asses it). Then, communicating through cognitive ambiguity rather than realizing strategic or image-related goals only persuades the persuaded and does not convince the unconvinced.
23 Cf. P. Bull, "Slippery", op. cit., but also P. Bull, "Slipperiness, evasion and ambiguity. Equivocation and facework in noncommittal political discourse", Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 2008, No. 27 (4) and P. Bull, K. Mayer, "How to answer in political interviews", Political Psychology 1993, No. 14 (4) . 
